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ABSTRACT
It has been widely assumed that the labour legislation of the 1980s has been
a major catalyst for change in British industrial relations.  The nature and extent of
the law's impact have usually been assumed and rarely been clearly articulated.  This
paper reports the results of part of a research project designed to investigate these
issues and the processes by which any legal influences took effect.  A survey of
negotiators in twenty five trade unions was carried out by questionnaire.  The
responses showed that the law had become a more important factor in the conduct
of disutes.  Its influence on union negotiators had not, however, been entirely
negative.  The law on strike ballots stood out as the most important of the changes
in the law made by the 1980s legislation and the use of ballots emerged as a feature
of union strategy in negotiations.  More often than not this produced positive results
from a union perspective.  Nevertheless overall a majority of negotiators saw the law
as an important factor favouring employers in the bargaining process.
This paper was produced as part of the Centre's
Programme on Industrial Relations
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INTRODUCTION
The second stage of our research project looking at the impact of changes in
the law in the 1980s on industrial relations practices, with particular reference to
disputes, focused on surveys of management and union negotiators.  The first stage
of the research involved interviews with employers' associations and trade unions at
head office level (see Elgar and Simpson, 1992).  The second stage was in two parts.
One of these consisted of structured interviews with some 70 managers in both the
public and private sectors.  The results of this aspect of our work are being written
up in the form of sectoral reports (see Elgar and Simpson, 1993).  This report presents
the overall results of the other part of this stage of the research, a questionnaire
survey of negotiators in 25 trade unions.
The survey was carried out by postal questionnaire in late 1991 and early 1992.
The 25 unions who took part had over six million members.  They included 15 of the
23 unions which were reported as having more than 100,000 members in 1991 (see
Certification Officer, 1992: Appendix 4).  The unions covered by the survey covered
a broad range of both public and private sector, and manual and non-manual
workers.  The information on experience of negotiations, industrial action and the law
is based on replies from: 727 Full Time Officers
 82 Lay Officials
 37 National Executive (NEC) members
846
2For the most part, responses in the larger unions were from district, regional
and area officers and reflected their own local experience.  In the smaller unions they
were mostly from national officers.  Responses from lay officials came from three
unions; the 37 NEC respondents were predominantly in one union, although there
were a small number in three others.  In addition there were ten responses from non-
negotiating officers.  These are included in the last point of the next section of this
paper, point 15 entitled Picture of the 1980s on p.10, making the total number of
useable responses 856.  The overall response rate was 58 per cent.  The responses to
the questionnaire therefore represent the experience of negotiators representing a
broad cross section of the unionised part of the workplace.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows.  First, the results of our analysis
of the responses to the questionnaire are presented in the form of 15 points to which
some explanatory notes have been added.  Second, we make some observations on
the three central issues which emerge from this analysis concerning the role of the
law in negotiations and disputes: the general influence of the law, strike ballots, and
the law and the individual worker.  Finally we make some concluding comments. 
3I.  MAIN POINTS FROM THE SURVEY 
Industrial action
1.  87% of negotiators said that industrial action had been seriously considered on
at 
least one occasion in disputes in the years 1989-91.
(i) 67% of these said that industrial action had been seriously considered on up to five
occasions.
(ii) 14% of these said that industrial action had been seriously considered on more
than 10 occasions.
(iii) There was some, albeit a relatively small, difference between the number of
occasions on which the action under consideration was a strike and the number of
occasions on which it was action short of a strike.  As a proportion of the total
number of times that industrial action was considered, action short of a strike was
greater. 
Notes
(i) It is clear from the responses that on some occasions both action short of a strike
and strike action were seriously considered in the same dispute. 
(ii) We cannot break down these figures and apportion them over the three years
41989, 1990 and 1991. 
(iii) Our information would suggest that in about two thirds of cases the industrial
action under consideration was limited to a single workplace.  On occasions, though,
more than one workplace was involved; 14 respondents, for example, reported that
industrial action had been considered in 1,000 or more workplaces.  These variations
probably reflect both the distribution of the union's membership and the nature of
bargaining units.
2.  73% of those who seriously considered industrial action replied that pay had
been an issue in the dispute(s) concerned.  The other issue most frequently
mentioned was changes in working practices by 44%.  Job losses and redundancies,
and terms and conditions other than pay were both reported as issues in dispute
by 35% of respondents.
Note
There was little significant difference between the incidence of issues mentioned in
relation to possible strike action and those mentioned in relation to action short of a
strike.  Notable although still small divergences were that pay was a more likely to
give rise to consideration of strike action and changes in working practices to action
short of a strike.
3.  65% of all respondents said that some of their members had taken industrial
action over the last three years.  For 37% of these this had only occurred once, and
for a further 46% between two and five times.    
Note 
This is not a measure of the number of members in these unions involved in
industrial action, but it can be said that in the experience of approximately two thirds
of negotiators in the survey, industrial action was taken by some of their members
in 1989-1991.
    
5Employers' threats to use the law
4.  Where industrial action had been seriously considered, 28% of negotiators (203
in total) had received some form of threat by employers to use the law over actual
or potential industrial action.  In only two unions did all respondents report no
threats of legal action.  In more than half of the instances where the grounds for
the employer's threat were known, it concerned the law on strike ballots,
sometimes together with other grounds.
Steps to start legal proceedings were experienced by negotiators in 18 unions, but in
small numbers.  Writs and/or solicitors' letters were reported by 50 negotiators,
which was 25% of those who had received threats or less than 7% of those who had
seriously considered industrial action. 
Notes
(i) The questionnaire attempted to distinguish threats made by employers before
industrial action occurred from threats made once industrial action had begun.  It is
clear from the responses that this distinction was not observed in many of them and
that meaningful conclusions can only be drawn on the overall incidence of threats of
use of the law.
(ii) Where respondents said that employers' threats of legal action did not relate to
balloting, but some other law, this covered a wide range of issues, not all of which
were the actual grounds on which legal proceedings could be based: eg. damage to
business and customer relations, or breach of procedure agreements.  There were also
a number of references to breach of individual contracts of employment, which
would not be strictly threats against the union or its officials, but rather threats
against individual workers - see points 5&6 below. 
(iii) Further information on threats of action relating to balloting identified a range
of alleged failures to comply with the law, concerning, amongst other things, the
content of the ballot paper, accompanying information and failure to hold a ballot.
65.  Where industrial action had been seriously considered, 255 respondents (35%)
had experience of threats by employers to dismiss workers who took industrial
action, made either before any action began or while it was taking place.  In only
27%  of cases where a threat was made was it actually carried out. 
6.  157 out of 442 negotiators who responded to the question said that deductions
had been made from the pay of workers taking action short of a strike.  52 out of
337 respondents said that other disciplinary action had been taken.
Note 
The number of respondents to this question was only around half of all respondents.
7.  There was a range of responses to questions on the impact of threats by
employers to use the law.  Respondents who had experienced employers
threatening legal proceedings were fairly evenly divided on whether they had been
influenced by this or whether this had affected either the industrial action or the
bargaining outcome.  This was equally true where a writ or solicitors' letter was
received. 
Where legal action had been threatened by employers, 21% of respondents said that
they had been influenced a lot; 25% to some degree; 19% a little; and 35% not at all.
7Ballots
8.  691 negotiators across all unions (82% of respondents) had experience of strike
ballots.  More than half reported between two and five ballots held over the last
three years.  Some reported significantly larger numbers.  74% said that they had
won more ballots than they had lost.
Notes
(i) Just 34 respondents reported more than 25 ballots held.  The average number of
ballots for the remaining 657 officials was just over five.
(ii) The percentage of yes and no votes in ballots was not significantly affected by
whether in the experience of the full time officer a greater or smaller number of
ballots had been held.  
(iii) It is clear that overall, greater numbers of ballots produced yes votes than
produced no votes.  We did not ask whether any ballots were held where negotiators
were expecting a no vote, for example to vindicate their negotiating position, but
there were no comments to this effect from respondents. 
9.  The main reason for holding strike ballots was the law - mentioned by 63% of
respondents; 48% referred to union policy and 46% to members' expectations that
they would be balloted.   Strengthening the hand of negotiators was seen to be an
important reason for holding strike ballots by 32% of respondents. 
810.  Where industrial action had been seriously considered, 599 respondents (81%)
reported occasions on which industrial action had been threatened but did not take
place.  82% of these (492) had experience of occasions when a strike ballot had
been held but no industrial action took place.
(i) 522 respondents, 87% of those who reported that although it had been seriously
considered no industrial action had occurred, said that this was because the dispute
was settled in negotiations.  In most of these cases this followed a ballot on industrial
action.
  
(ii) 28% reported occasions when no industrial action had taken place for reasons
other than settlement of the dispute through negotiations.  This was normally because
a ballot had either been lost or not won sufficiently convincingly (e.g. narrow
majority or low turnout).  In some unions respondents also mentioned the impact of
employers' threats to discipline individuals who took part in industrial action.
11.  30% of all respondents were aware of unballoted industrial action that had
taken place within the last three years.
912.  96% of negotiators reported that they consulted members over accepting or
rejecting pay offers.  58% of these reported using workplace ballots, 52% a show
of hands at a members' meeting and 32% postal ballots.  Balloting as a means of
consulting the members had become increasingly common.
Changes in methods of consultation were reported by more than a third of
negotiators.
13.  Consultation on industrial action similarly took a number of forms, but
invariably included a ballot, predominantly workplace.  71% of respondents
referred to a workplace ballot and 45% to a postal or semi-postal ballot.  Just 23
respondents, less than 3%, referred only to a show of hands at a members' meeting.
14.  88% of respondents said that they were responsible for organising industrial
action ballots.  For half of these other full time officers were their main source of
advice; 42% referred to the union's legal officer.
64% of those responding to the question said that they often or always made use of
this advice.
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Picture of the 1980s
15.  A summary of responses from all respondents provides the following
information:
(i) 93% thought that employers had become more hardline in dealings with unions.
(ii) 84% thought that members were now more reluctant to take industrial action.
(iii) Only 18% agreed with the suggestion that more industrial action was now
unofficial.  
(iv) 63% thought that the law had been the most important factor affecting industrial
action and 52% thought that the law had been an important weapon favouring
employers in their negotiations.
(v) 68% thought that strike ballots were a good thing for trade unions.
(vi) 37% agreed with the statement that officials were now more accountable to
members.
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II.  OBSERVATIONS
1.  General influence of the law
A majority of negotiators perceived the law to be important at a general level; 63%
thought that the law was the most important factor affecting industrial action.  This
response, however, needs to be seen in the context of their comments which
frequently emphasised the importance of the economic climate, especially in relation
to the willingness of individuals to take industrial action, and, more particularly in
public sector unions, organisational changes that had taken place in the 1980s.  In
attributing influence to the law in the context of a broader picture of the 1980s,
respondents could have had in mind the high profile disputes in which the law was
used against unions, in some cases against their own union.
In their own experience, the influence of the law was also apparent.  There was
significant, if in the experience of most unions numerically small, use of the law by
employers at the level of threats: overall 203 cases were reported affecting all but two
unions.  But it was rare for this to get near to legal proceedings.  These threats related
mainly to ballots.  Apart from this there was no coherent pattern to the grounds for
employers' threats.  It must be doubtful whether many of them had any clear legal
basis, although if employers involved solicitors this would no doubt be a different
matter.  The fact that some employers apparantly made threats for which there was
no legal basis is indicative of the importance which the parties' perceptions of their
legal rights and obligations may have, even where these are some way removed from
the reality of the law.
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Whilst respondents who had experienced threats of legal action expressed a range of
opinions about the extent to which they had been influenced by them, in the 50 cases
in which a solicitor's letter or writ had been received this was often said to have had
no impact on the industrial action or bargaining outcome.  In some cases, far from
undermining the industrial action, the employer's resort to the law was seen to have
strengthened the members' resolve.  The responses, therefore, demonstrate the
limitations of trying to assess the influence of the law solely by reference to the
number of occasions on which legal proceedings were actually started and the legal
outcome of those proceedings. 
The law may have had a particular impact on some unions because of the way in
which they had adapted their practices and procedure to the new legal requirements.
A number of unions had taken extensive steps to impress upon their officials the
need to stay on the right side of the law in all circumstances.  Negotiators in these
unions would therefore be likely to report that the law had had a considerable impact
regardless of whether employers with whom they dealt had shown any propensity
to make use of the law.  It should be noted in this context that the picture emerging
from responses to the questionnaire was of unions and their officials who sought by
and large to conduct industrial action lawfully.
Threats of dismissal against members were more widespread than threats against the
union or its officials.  Where industrial action had been seriously considered, they
were reported by 35% of respondents.  When these threats against individual workers
are taken together with employers' `use' of the law against the union or its officials
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referred to above, this would seem to suggest that, whether or not it was expressly
invoked, the law was generally a relevant factor in disputes.  52% of respondents said
that the law had been an important weapon for employers in the negotiations they
conducted.
2.  Ballots
Most if not all unions which took part in the survey had clearly sought to adapt their
practices to comply with the requirements of the law on industrial action balloting.
The information suggested that, under the law as it was up to 1993, conducting a
lawful ballot was not seen as a particular problem in most unions, although a small
minority had not found it so easy to accommodate the balloting requirement.  A
majority of ballots held in all unions produced votes in favour of industrial action;
74% of respondents reported more ballots won than lost and 50% said that all ballots
had produced votes in favour of industrial action.  In their response to the general
questions, 68% of respondents said that they thought industrial action ballots had
been a good thing for unions.  Their comments were consistent with this view.  Many
respondents said that balloting was popular among members - and not unpopular
among officers.  The legal detail and delays in action taking place had, however,
created difficulties so that ballots were seen by some respondents as a device to
prevent industrial action taking place.
Whilst only 32% of respondents said that one of the most important reasons for
industrial action balloting was to strengthen the hand of negotiators, the use of
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ballots emerged as a feature of union strategy in negotiations.  Of those who said that
industrial action had been seriously considered but did not take place, an
overwhelming majority said that in their experience disputes had been settled in
negotiations and more than three quarters of these that, at least on occasions, this had
followed a ballot.  Respondents' comments confirmed that a convincing `yes' vote in
a ballot could often lead to an improved offer or withdrawal of proposals in dispute
without industrial action going ahead.  In some unions a number of respondents also
referred to ballots as a way of galvanising support for industrial action.  The survey
therefore provides strong evidence that ballots have assisted negotiators in bargaining
and that while a majority of ballots are won, this does not necessarily lead to
industrial action.
Ballots had, however, had negative effects as well as positive ones.  Low turnouts and
narrow majorities as well as the minority of lost ballots were factors mentioned
where, although it was seriously considered, no industrial action occurred but the
dispute was not resolved by a negotiated agreement.  Another negative effect that
was seen to be a problem by negotiators in some unions was that they could find
themselves exposed in negotiations if a ballot majority was not reflected in support
among members for actually taking industrial action. This was a risk in the element
of bluff which negotiators claimed to have built into the bargaining process by using
ballots.
3. The law and the individual worker
The survey provides evidence that some employers recognised the effectiveness of
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targeting their strategy in response to actual or threatened industrial action at the
level of the individual. There are two factors that may have been responsible for this.
The first, which was emphasised in the comments of a number of respondents, was
fears for job security in an adverse economic climate.  The second was the individual
worker's weak legal position when taking industrial action.  Information from our
interviews with employers confirmed a high degree of awareness of their legal rights
in relation to individual workers who take industrial action (see Elgar and Simpson,
1993:9).  This awareness may be part of the explanation for members' increasing
reluctance to take industrial action, which was reported by 84% of negotiators. 
III. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The results of the survey suggest that the law was a relevant factor in
collective labour relations at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.  Overall
the law was, unsurprisingly, seen to favour employers.  It is notable that of the two
legal issues which were of greatest concern to respondents, one, the threat of
dismissal against individual workers, did not depend on the legislative changes of
the 1980s, although amendments to the law on unfair dismissal in relation to
industrial action  may have helped to heighten employers' awareness of the full
extent of their rights.  While threats to dismiss workers who take industrial action,
and even actual dismissals, are not new, in an adverse economic climate they have
evidently become a more valuable tactic for employers to use.
The other central legal issue for respondents did arise from the 1980s
legislation.  This was balloting.  On this issue negotiators saw positive as well as
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negative results.  An important feature of the responses from all unions was the way
in which they had been able to adapt to - and even in effect to adopt - the need to
hold a ballot before industrial action.  This was true despite the persistent
modification of the law (at least before 1993) and in a sense the law seemed to
provide only a background to the organisation of ballots which had become very
much part of internal union procedures.  This was especially so in unions with a
tradition of balloting; where unions lacked this tradition but there was more evidence
that they had not accommodated the balloting requirement so easily.
While the survey showed the law to be a relevant issue for union negotiators
which generally could not be ignored, it is necessary to bear in mind three particular
features of the responses in order to maintain a proper perspective on the information
which they provide about the role of the law in disputes.  First, there is a danger that
the number of reports of threats by employers to use the law may overstate the
extent to which employers actually invoked the law.  It is apparent from information
which we have from union legal officers that what might appear to negotiators as
threats by employers to use the law were, on occasion, more appropriately seen as
employers seeking clarification of the union's position, especially in relation to
balloting.  The dividing line between an employer seeking clarification and
threatening legal action is clearly not always easy to draw and if negotiators thought
that employers were threatening to invoke the law that may have affected their
subsequent actions, even if in reality the employer was making a less aggressive
response.  On this issue, it is evident from respondents' comments that where they
said that employer's threats of legal action had influenced the outcome of the dispute,
this by no means always meant that the threat served to undermine industrial action;
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in some cases quite the contrary.
Second, respondents with members in those areas of the public services which
started to undergo radical organisational changes in the 1980s frequently emphasised
the overwhelming impact of these changes on industrial relations in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.  In their view the impact of these developments, which included
devolving some management decisions and the introduction of competition in the
provision of services, far outweighed the impact of changes in the law on industrial
disputes.
Third, contrary to what might have been expected, it is apparent that at least
in the 1989-1991 period, consideration of industrial action was a live issue, on
occasion, for a large majority of negotiators in most of these unions.  The actual
incidence of industrial action was dependent on a number of factors, not least the
occurrence of national disputes in some areas in this three year period.  Moreover,
in some parts of the public sector, especially where members worked in the caring
professions, the appropriateness of any form of industrial action continued to be
debated.  Nevertheless, in these areas as in others, negotiators' experience of
industrial action having taken place in the period 1989 - 1991 was quite widespread.
With these three features in mind, it seems fair to conclude that while the law
could be an influence on negotiators,  it was clearly not generally determinative of
whether or not industrial action occurred.  The information supplied by respondents
provided rich insights into their experience of disputes and the law.  Assessing the
nature and extent of the influence of the law is a complex issue which has to balance
the relative strengths of the pluses and minuses which these respondents identified.
These insights have greatly increased our understanding of the real impact of the law.
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